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ENFORCEABILITY OF INTEREST ON INTEREST
IN COLORADO
LESLIE R. KEHL*

This article is intended to be an examination of all the law
in Colorado relevant to the question, "Is a prior agreement to
compound interest, if such interest is not paid on accrual, enforceable in Colorado?"
The validity of such an agreement under usury laws is not
considered except to distinguish the problem here involved from
the problem in the usury cases. Neither does this article deal with
the validity of increasing the rate of interest on default of either
interest or principal.
Promissory notes which include a provision for compounding
interest are in common usage in the state of Colorado. Examples
of such provisions are the following:
If principal and interest are not paid when due, to
bear interest at the rate of ----per cent per annum payable
annually.
Upon failure to pay any installment of principal or
interest when due, the entire balance owing hereon .
shall draw interest . . .
Makers and endorses agree that if this note is not
paid promptly at maturity, that unpaid principal and defaulting interest shall bear interest . . .I
Apparently from the common usage these provisions enjoy, the
public is of the opinion that such provisions are binding. The law,
however, is not as certain as this opinion would indicate.
STARE DECIsIS

The first indication that the Colorado court would not allow
contracting in advance to pay interest on interest appeared in
an 1881 case involving the plaintiff's right to interest on rents
wrongfully withheld. The court analogized between rents and
interest in this language:
The earlier authorities were emphatic in their refusal of interest in such (rent) cases. The doctrine was
'interest is a compensation for the use of moneys; rents
a compensation for the use of lands; compound interest
(though agreed to by the parties) will never be allowed;
so neither will interest be allowed on rent in arrears.' 2
The reference to compound interest was actually dictum and no
Colorado authority was cited. The dictum was cited a year later
* Student at the University of Denver, College of Law.

'Taken from form notes currently in use in Denver, Colo.
- Filmore v. Reithman, 6 Colo. 120 (1881).
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when the court reversed a decree of the lower court on grounds
that the amount of interest was reached by compounding interest
under the legal interest statute. The court held such action was
not warranted under the statute. The words "moneys after they
in the statute, were interpreted to not income due," appearing
3
clude interest due.
Shortly thereafter came the leading case of Hochmark v.
Richler 4 which left no doubt concerning the state of the law. In
this case a loan of $150 was obtained and the note was given a
face value of $177 which included $27 interest. The note was to
draw interest at 3% per annum on the face value if not paid at
maturity. The court refused to enforce the 3% interest on the
$27 stating this was compound interest and not enforceable in
this state.5
The law set out in the Hochmark case has never been expressly
overruled and has been recognized in a number of subsequent
cases. 6 The effect on the validity of the contract, as a whole, is
made clear by the Hochmark case and is to be differentiated from
the effect of usury. The rule of the case is based on a public policy
against interest on interest and not on interest which aggregates
more than the legal rate. The ruling is not as drastic as in usury
cases and results only in non-enforcement of the amount of interterest which is attributable to interest on interest. The court
states:
The fact that compound interest was thus provided
for did not, however, as counsel contends, render the entire contract usurious and void. Courts upon grounds of
public policy, simply decline to enforce payment of the
interest upon interest.It should also be noted that the case goes further than holding
compound interest, strictly speaking, is not recoverable, and concludes that any interest on interest is not recoverable. The distinction betwen compound interest and interest on interest is made
clear in the following language:
There are two distinct methods of computing what
is loosely termed compound interest. By the first method
periodical rests are made and at each rest the principal
and the accrued interest thereon are combined into a
new principal which bears interest until the next rest
and so on; this method results in giving interest not only
on the principal and on the interest on the principal, but
Denver Brick and Mfg. Co.

%.

McAllister, 6 Colo. 261 (1882).

416 Colo. 263, 26 P. 818 (1891).

See also Beckwith v. Beckwith, 11 Colo. 568, 19 P. 510 (1888), to the same
effect as the principal case.
6Lake County v. Linn, 29 Colo. 446, 88 P.

Colo. 115, 111 P. 713 (1910).
7
Note 4, sipri.

839 (1902);

Wigton v. Elliott, 49'
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also in giving interest on the interest on the interest and
so on ad infinitum until payment, and this is what is
meant by compound interest when the term is used in
its strict sense. By the other method the accrued interest
is not combined with the principal but each installment
of interest on the principal becomes itself a new principal which bears simple interest, but no interest is allowed
on the interest on interest, and, although this method is
also sometimes called compound interest it has been more
correctly described as a middle course between simple
and compound interest, and has been distinguished from
compound interest. 8
Although the term "compound interest" is used in the Hochmark
case, it is clear from the facts that the court was dealing only
with interest on interest, or as it is sometimes called "annual
interest." 9 Thus, if no annual interest is allowed, a fortiori, no
compound interest is allowed.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HOCHMARK RULE
The Hochmark case indirectly mentions this exception to the
general rule, "There was in the present case no such gross delinquency or intentional misconduct on the part of appellant as justified an exception to the foregoing rule." 14)
In addition to this exception, the Colorado court has added
these exceptions in following decisions:
1. Coupons representing interest on a municipal bond are subject
to interest on the coupons themselves. 1
2. Coupons representing interest on a promissory note are subject to interest on the coupons themselves. (Distinguished
from
12
exception number 1 in that this is a private obligation.)_
3. An agreement executed after interest accrues to subject 13such
accrued interest to a charge of interest on itself, is valid.
4. An agreement made and payable in another state where interest on interest is allowed will be enforced in Colorado even
though such
agreement would have been invalid if made in
14
Colorado.
THEORY BEHIND THE LAW
The reason for the Hochmark decision was clearly public
policy, but the basis behind the public policy is not so easily ascertained. Reliance is placed on Parsons on Contracts.': Parsons
states:
'C.J.S. (Interest) Sec. 1, 1). 10.
A.L.R. 332.

"37

"See

also Filmore v. Reithman, .'tpr~t. note 2.

Lake County v. Linn, sitpr, note 5.
Parker v. McGinty, 77 Colo. 458, 239 P. 10 (1925).
'"Wigton v. Elliott, vifpra. note 5.
"Baxter v. Beckwith, 25 Colo. App. 322, 137 P. 901 (1914).
" Although the court cites volume two of this work it is believed the proper
citation is Vol. 3, 6th edition (1873), Sec. 150 rt sCq.
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Upon the whole, although it seems to be well settled
that compound interest cannot be recovered, as such,
even if it be expressly promised, we are inclined to think,
that the only rule of law against the allowance of compound interest is this: that the courts will not lend their
aid to enforce its payment, unless upon a promise of the
debtor made after the interest, upon which interest is
demanded, has accrued; and this rule is adopted, not because such contracts are usurious, or savor of usury, unless very remotely; but upon grounds of public policy, in
order to avoid harsh and oppressive accumulations of interest. And for the reason that this aversion of our law
to allow money to beget money has of late years very
much diminished, we do not think it absolutely certain,
that a bargain in advance for the payment of compound
interest, in all its facts reasonable and free from suspicion of oppression, would not be enforced at this day
in some of our courts. It has, indeed, been held that an
agreement to pay interest on accrued interest, is not invalid.
Thus we perceive the basic theory to be, "Prior agreements to
compound interest on default are harsh and oppressive." It appears that agreements made after the accrual of interest are
equally harsh and oppressive since the result achieved is the same.
One difference is, however, readily ascertainable. The debtor has
a choice at the end of each period when there is no prior agreement. Of course, it is not a choice without some amount of coercion in the form of a debt due and owing with possible judgment
and execution on failure to agree to compounding the interest. It
is also ironic to note that if a judgment were obtained, the judgment would undoubtedly include the amount of the interest, and
the court would allow the legal rate of interest on the full amount
of the judgment, until satisfied. Thus the debtor finds himself
paying interest on interest regardless of the alternative he chooses.
The theory in favor of allowance of interest on interest is
well expressed in Hale v. Hale :16
If it be assumed that it was stipulated in the original contract that the interest should be paid, we hold
that there is nothing illegal or immoral or contrary to
policy in such an agreement. The interest is both legally
and equitably due at the expiration of the period limited
for its payment; and if, instead of paying the interest,
it be converted into principal by the previous agreement
of the parties, we think there can be no objection to enforcing such an agreement.
"Hale v. Hale, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 233, 78 Am. Dec. 490 (1860).
this case is found in 37 A.L.R. 328.

A note on
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Thus we have the opposing theories. One on the premise,
"Do not kick a man when he is down," and the other on the premise, "The creditor is being deprived of money he is legally entitled
to have and therefore the creditor should receive the value of the
use of this money."
THE LAW TODAY
As we have seen the Colorado court has come to the aid of the
debtor in past years on grounds of public policy. (This is a rather
unexpected result when you consider that the same public policy
is not offended by a cognovit provision in a note.) Yet public
policy is a changing standard and perhaps the modern trend in
favor of interest on interest mentioned, but not followed, in Parsons on Contracts (1873) supra, and reiterated in Hochmark v.
Richler (1891) supra, has been adopted in Colorado.
A statement made by Mr. Justice Burke in a 1942 case might
be interpreted as adopting the trend. The statement was, "Compound interest is allowable only when definitely agreed upon." 17
Mr. Justice Burke cites Denver Brick & Mfg. Co. v. McAllister,
supra, as authority for his position. As mentioned earlier in this
article, it is authority only for the proposition that the legal interest statute does not provide for compounding the interest provided in that statute. In fact, Denver Brick & Mfg. Co. expressly
follows Filmore v. Reithman, supra, which was the first case stating the general rule against interest on interest.
The statement made by Mr. Justice Burke was not necessary
to the decision and therefore must be weighed as dictum in considering its effect on prior decisions. Also it must be held that the
words "compound interest" as used by Justice Burke must mean
the compounding of interest by agreement entered prior to the
accrual. The Colorado court has, in effect, held that the words
"compound interest" indicate a prior agreement. The Court expressly stated that an agreement after accrual of interest to add
such accrued interest to the principal and charge interest on the
whole is not compounding interest. Thus by inference there must
be a prior agreement in order to constitute compound interest.
Note this language:
In brief, as applied to the facts of this case, the law
is that after interest becomes due, it may, by agreement,
be turned into principal and bear interest.
Such an ar8
rangement is not compounding interest.'
Apparently then, considering this language, Justice Burke's statement amounts to an assertion that an express agreement to compound interest on accrual is enforceable.
There has been no judicial interpretation of this language
in Colorado and no express interpretation by any court. The Fed' Tarabino Real Estate Co. Inc. v. Tarabino, 109 Colo. 425, 126 P.

"Wigton v. Elliott, 49 Colo. 115, 111 P. 713 (1910).

859 (1942).

DICTA

May, 1954

eral District Court for the District of Missouri did have occasion
to construe Colorado law with respect to compound interest in
1944, two years after Justice Burke's dictum. That court followed
the Hochmark case and refused to allow interest on interest.":
The dictum was not mentioned and probably not considered.
Although the Missouri Federal Court's decision is in no way
binding on the Colorado court it indicates that a Supreme Court
decision will be necessary to detrmine the present state of the law
in Colorado concerning compound interest. In the opinion of the
writer, the time is ripe for an attack upon the doctrine establishing the non-enforceability of interest on interest. The court may
well seize upon Justice Burke's dictum to establish a current public
policy in favor of interest on interest.

AMENDMENT OF SUPREME COURT RULE
Effective April 15, 1954, the rule relating to the Supreme
Court Library was amended to read as follows:
Rule 262. Supreme Court Library. No books
may be removed or withdrawn from the library by
any person, except members of the court for use in
their chambers.
Members of the Bar are asked to search their office as
well as their conscience, for the following volumes, missing
from the library:
Vol. 4, Nebraska Revised Statutes, 1943.
Vols. 508, 598, 1282, 1448, 1531 and 1611 of the bound
volumes of Abstracts and Briefs. These volumes cannot be
replaced and the co-operation of the Bar is solicited in effecting their return to the library.
FLOYD F. MILES, Librarian.

CONFERENCE DATE SET
The Annual Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit
will be held at the Stanley Hotel, in Estes Park, Colorado,
Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, July 12, 13 and 14, 1954.
Reservations can be made by writing Mr. George Stobie, Manager of the Hotel. All i.iembers of the Bar are cordially invited to attend.
"Lee
(1944).

v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 56 F. Supp. 362

